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ABSTRACT  
Corporate governance helps to limit problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and management interests. The principal-agent problem occurs when 
managers act in their benefit at the expense of shareholders. Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) offer a unique setting to investigate the effect corporate governance 
has on a firm's performance by tackling corporate governance problems. Corporate 
governance and REITs research has received notable coverage; mostly in the United 
States with limited research directed at other REITs regimes (United Kingdom, South 
Africa and Nigeria). Additionally, researchers have largely ignored the investment 
decision-making processes undertaken by REITs and the effect this has on 
performance; as not all decisions are rational. This paper aims to identify the critical 
elements of corporate governance, investment decision-making by REITs. The 
findings will contribute to the development of a corporate governance scoring 
framework based on an analysis drawn from the United Kingdom, South Africa and 
Nigeria REITs. The framework will be further developed using detailed case studies 
and secondary sources of data, and a proposed self-scoring measurement of the quality 
of corporate governance and investment decision-making for REITs.  
Keywords: corporate governance, firm performance, investment decision-making, real 
estate investment trust, real estate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is a company that owns income-generating 
real estate, like mutual funds. It allows investors the ability to invest in the real estate 
sector that is capital intensive, enjoying benefits of diversification and capital 
appreciation. The concept of indirect investment in real estate through REITs has 
generated significant interest globally with major regimes introduced in both 
developed and emerging markets. Global REITs has grown at an enormous rate since 
the global financial crisis of 2007/2009. REITs or REIT-like regimes are now present 
in over 36 countries, made up of over 480 corporations with a market capitalization 
reaching US$1,544 billion and a dividend yield of 3.7% above the FTSE All-world 
yield of 2.43% as at February 2017 (FTSE 2017a). REITs became operational in 2007 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and Nigeria while in South Africa (SA) the legislation 
for REITs formation was passed in 2013 allowing the conversion of existing listed 
property companies to REITs. The UK has 28 REITs capitalized at US$61,67 billion, 
SA having 11 REITs capitalized at US$17.9 billion and Nigeria has 3 REITs 
capitalized at US$125.949 million (FTSE 2017b; CAHF 2017). Though REITs 																																																								
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jurisdictions have some differences in structure, strategy and operations, certain key 
themes for performance remain constant. Ernst & Young (2016) identified 12 broad 
areas to be focused on for better development and acceptability of REITs. Of these 12 
broad areas identified, 9 areas (capital flow to the sector, financing, property specifics, 
financial reporting, regulatory environment, cross-border issues, transaction activity, 
risk management, and lastly corporate governance) are represented in every REIT 
regime and help to portray the level of its maturity. However, corporate structure, 
capital allocation and market trends are seen to vary across countries, and at the firm 
level.  
The significance of corporate governance and performance of REITs is further 
observed in the recent publication of the Global Real Estate Transparency Index 2016, 
which inter alia shows, that when evaluating the real estate market in any country, 
corporate governance plays a vital role on the index. The UK is ranked 1st in 
transparency with an established REITs regime, SA ranked 25th with an emerging 
REITs and Nigeria 88th with low transparency (JLL 2016). These findings suggest a 
need for better understanding of the challenges facing emerging REITs with the 
disclosure of corporate governance and financial transaction key to investment in the 
sector. As REITs continues to gain popularity, there is a need for more research to 
understand the effects of corporate governance and investment decision-making on the 
performance of REITs. From preliminary observation, the bulk of prominent research 
on these themes originated from studies on REITs regimes in the United States and 
Asia Pacific region. REITs in the UK, SA and Nigeria have so far received limited 
research. For REITs, to remain an attractive investment option, corporate governance 
structure and investment decision-making processes are crucial. A review of relevant 
literature on corporate governance and investment decision-making by REITs will be 
carried out, on studies of REITs regimes operating in the UK, SA, and Nigeria. 
RESEARCH METHOD  
The study adopts a literature review to examine; the unique REIT structure; quality of 
corporate governance, investment decision-making and its impact on REIT 
performance.  The findings will provide insights to develop questions for the second 
stage of the study involving detailed case studies in the REITs jurisdictions of UK, 
SA, and Nigeria to understand the critical elements of corporate governance and 
investment decision-making to improve the performance of REITs further. Relevant 
literature in the key thematic areas (corporate governance, investment decision-
making and REITs) were searched using Google Scholar, to obtain journal articles and 
reports. The REIT regimes of the UK, SA, and Nigeria are selected due to close 
similarity in their REIT structure and corporate governance regulation and how it is 
applied. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Corporate governance remains a crucial part of the success of a firm. Disputes exist, as 
REITs operating in highly developed institutions have shown the limited effect of 
corporate governance on their performance. Corporate governance as seen from a 
developed REIT regime perspective may not apply directly to emerging or developing 
regimes. Using corporate governance in real estate investment trust (REIT), it is 
possible to assess the impact corporate governance has on the performance of REITs 
taking account each jurisdiction corporate governance specifics. Parker (2014) 
examining real estate investment decision-making conceptualized it as when $1 of 
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shareholder capital is converted into $1 of property investment, both authors reviewed 
the literature around property investment decision-making overall and the decision-
making process of REITs. He suggests an identification of the normative model of 
property investment decision-making from literature, followed by a descriptive model 
obtained from interviews of decision makers and finally a prescriptive model to show 
how ideally investment decisions making can be optimized. However, real estate 
investment decision-making process takes on many stages or phases which have 
resulted in ambiguity in processes and inconsistency in definitions leading to different 
classifications of the real estate investment decision-making start and end points in 
models developed by various researchers.  
CONCEPT AND SCOPE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Understanding the concept and scope of corporate governance can pose some 
challenges. Notwithstanding, this can be viewed from two prevailing perspectives 
which are the behavioural pattern and normative framework. Scoping using the 
behavioural pattern will be carried out in a single country or at firm level looking at 
the things such as the behaviour of corporations, performance measures, financial 
structures, efficiency, growth and treatment of shareholders and stakeholders. On the 
other hand, the normative framework of corporate governance relates to the system of 
regulations, labour and financial markets under which firms operate. Research on 
REITs and corporate governance has mostly been carried out using the behavioural 
pattern.   
Claessens & Yurtoglu (2012) identifies that behavioural pattern which studies firms 
with a country researcher evaluates; board of director’s operations, executive 
compensation on firm performance, the relationship between labour policies & 
performance and roles of stakeholders & shareholders. They add that weak corporate 
governance in a country and firm-level caused by a lack of transparency and 
information asymmetric problem will eventually result in a failing financial market. 
This study on governance, economic development and well-being find that a better 
corporate governance framework is of advantage to firms coming with ease of access 
to funding, reduced cost of capital, improved firm performance and acceptability by 
stakeholders internationally. Using the behavioral pattern, researchers have examined 
different subject areas under various themes; agency cost, ownership and managerial 
behavior (Jensen & Meckling 1976), financing, information asymmetric problem and 
agency (Myers & Majluf 1984), investment behavior and ownership (Hartzell et al. 
2006), corporate governance and capital structure (Brenni 2014). These papers look at 
the various individual component of the corporate governance discussion analyzed 
from different underlying performance measures such as Tobin’s Q, return on equity 
or asset etc. These studies demonstrated the significance of corporate governance and 
the direction which future research may be heading.  
REITS STRUCTURE  
The unique structure of REITs brings about a different aspect of the corporate 
governance research due to its peculiar structure which differentiates it from regular c 
corporation. Similarities in the REIT structures of UK, SA, and Nigeria are observed 
in their; distribution requirement, ownership structure, listing requirement, and asset 
activities restrictions (see Table 1). The REIT structure and operation changes the 
rationale of the principal-agent problem; which is a situation where agents take 
decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of current shareholders. This is as a 
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result of shareholders lacking  the incentive to monitor the principal due to diverse 
ownership (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Examining the REIT structure and operations, 
the distribution rule which requires REITs to distribute at least a minimum of 70%-
75% in Nigeria and SA while in the UK at least 90%, should check the principle-agent 
problem by restricting cash flow. The cash flow restriction unique to REITs limit 
agent’s expropriation and requires the agent to make an effective investment decision 
that provides long-term benefits to shareholders. It is also an essential feature in 
monitoring REITs as they are forced to return to the capital market for external 
funding allowing potential investors to analyze firm performance. 
Table 1: Analysis of REITs structure in Jurisdiction of study based on corporate governance 
mechanisms  
 Nigeria REIT U.K. REIT South African REIT 
Listing  Yes Yes Yes  
Management  Internally mostly Internally or Externally  Internally or Externally  
Income Distribution Minimum 70% At least 90% At least 75%  
Leverage Limited to 15% 1.25 or greater 60% assets  
Activity Restrictions 75% of total asset 
directly invested in 
real estate. 25% of real 
estate related assets.   
At least 75% of profit 
and 75% of total asset 
value must be related to 
the property business. 
75% of income from 
rental or from indirect 
property owned  
Shareholding 
Restriction  
Minimum of 300  35% shares available to 
the public. New REITs 
‘close’ to 1st 3yr 
20% held by the public if 
it must be listed 
Taxation at REIT 
Level 
Exempt from income 
& capital gain.  
Exempted.  Exempted 
Taxation at 
Shareholder Level 
Corporate and 
Individual 
shareholders pay a 
discounted tax and 
WT 
Domestic corporate 
shareholders pay CT 
rate, and individual 
shareholders are subject 
to WT, CGT and foreign 
shareholders pay WT  
CGT 22.4%. Individuals 
pay CGT of 40% of 
gains on taxable income. 
Effective rate 7.2% and 
16.4% 
Source: Compiled author and Adapted from Wai (2013) 
Ownership structure requires REITs be widely owned influencing its corporate 
governance. This rule prevents the build-up of blockholders that influence investment 
decision-making, benefiting from inside knowledge and preventing hostile take-over 
allowing REITs to focus more on long-term strategies. Amendments to REITs 
legislation has allowed for institutional investors without breaking the diverse 
ownership requirement; this increased monitoring by institutional investors to ensure 
investments by REITs align with long-term shareholders objectives. From asset 
activities restrictions, REITs invest largely in real estate. It is possible to observe real 
estate investment activities and the potential to study the investment decisions making 
at the firm and asset level as most REITs are publicly listed, and activity restriction 
rules in most countries require 75% of assets be invested in property, making it 
possible to identify when a major property is acquired, held and disposed (Eichholtz & 
Yönder 2015). Though the REITs structure provides a way of tackling corporate 
governance problems, shortfallings exist. Bauer et al. (2010) identified that the 
compulsory payout distribution only applies to net earnings, with an allowance of 
substantial depreciation on real estate income written off from its taxable earning 
allowing REITs managers to freely decide on the actual payout ratio of the free cash 
flow. It is important for REITs regimes in the UK, SA, and Nigeria to take note of the 
unique elements of its structure such as; distribution requirement, ownership structure, 
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listing requirement, and asset activities restrictions that have an influence on corporate 
governance and investment decision-making. 
QUALITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN REITs 
The REITs regimes in UK, SA and Nigeria represent a significant part of each 
country’s real estate market. By market capitalization, the UK has the largest 
operating REITs in Europe; SA REITs the largest in Africa due to its vibrant real 
estate market and Nigeria operates the largest REITs in sub-Saharan Africa (CAHF 
2017). The REITs regimes in Nigeria and SA are relatively immature when compared 
to those operating in the UK and all have in common a lack in the breadth of research 
evaluating the concepts of corporate governance, investment decision making and how 
this affects performance.  
Drawing from research from other REIT regimes, it is possible to examine the effect 
of corporate governance on the performance of REITs using selected individual 
corporate governance factors such as; ownership structure, executive compensation, 
board composition. Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) looking at CEO overconfidence in 
US REIT investment found that CEOs who are overconfident make more investments 
which usually are suboptimal investment decisions resulting in poor investment and 
lower net present value (NPV). Hartzell et al. (2006) looking at various ownership and 
board factors of equity REITs from 1995 to 2004 observed that there is a positive 
relationship between institutional, insider ownership and Tobin’s Q. REITs with a 
strong corporate governance respond positively to investment decisions that improve 
performance but decreases with the entrenchment of insider ownership. Looking at 
executive compensation, Ooi (2009) observed that in 20 Singapore REITs, after IPO 
there is an inverse relationship between the base fee and performance, but a positive 
relationship between incentive fees post IPO performance of REITs. These studies 
provide a multitude of results from the different association between selected 
corporate governance factors and performance variables. To summarize, the 
performance of REITs in the long run, just like other investments, will be affected by 
the major institutional factors; corporate governance, legal quality and accounting 
standard quality (Edelstein et al. 2011).  
On the measure of the quality of corporate governance, there are several corporate 
governance ratings, indices or scoring framework that has been used in research on 
REITs corporate governance and performance. These are accepted and used by 
academics and institutions globally in the measurement of quality of corporate 
governance (see Table 2). A summary of these include; a self-constructed corporate 
governance rating used by (Brenni 2014); Governance Index (G-Index) based on the 
Institutional Investor Research Centre (IRRC) applies takeover provisions an external 
corporate governance proxy for measuring shareholder rights (Gompers et al. 2003); 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index developed by the Institutional 
Shareholder Services measures both internal and external corporate governance 
proxies used in studies of REITs mostly in Europe and US; Entrenchment Index 
measures external corporate governance proxies that limit shareholders right and 
resistance to hostile takeover; and the Asia Pacific Real Estate Association Corporate 
Governance Scoring Framework (APREA CGSF) using external and internal corporate 
governance in mainly Singapore REITs (Lecomte & Ooi 2013).Apart from the G-
Index and Entrenchment Index which measures external proxies of corporate 
governance, a higher score on the other scores (using internal and external proxies) 
can be translated as having better corporate governance practice that reduces agency 
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problem translating to better performance. This is considered a more efficient 
approach, offering a better understanding of the quality of corporate governance, 
investment decision-making and performance of REIT. 
The use of corporate governance scores or indices provides an alternative 
methodology for the measurement of the quality of corporate governance because of 
the selection of proxies (internal or external proxies of governance) used in the 
measurement. Corporate governance scores or indices should be used with an 
understanding of the underlying criteria for measuring performance. Evidence from 
strongly regulated economies such as the UK and the United States show that 
corporate governance has less impact on performance. 
Table 2 Analysis of researchers on corporate governance and performance using a score 
Literature Index/Framework Performance  Finding 
Brenni (2014): UK 
REITs 
Self-Constructed  Tangibility, firm size, 
profitability, volatility, 
growth opportunities, non- 
debt tax  
Board Size, CEO duality, tenure, 
and remuneration -VE correlated 
to leverage. Board independence 
(non-executive directors) +VE 
related to leverage.  
Bauer et al. (2010): 
US REITs 
CGQ Index ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, 
sales growth, net profit 
margin 
Index not related to Tobin’s q or 
ROA, ROE 
Lecomte & Ooi 
(2013): S-REITs 
APREA 1yr forward stock return, 
Jensen alpha, ROA, ROE 
Corporate governance and stock 
performance +VE. -VE to 
operating performance.  
Gompers et al. 
(2003): US 
G-Index Excess returns, Tobin’s Q, 
net profit margin, ROE, 1 yr 
sales growth 
Stronger shareholder rights have 
+VE firm value, profits, and 
sales growth. No link to ROE  
Bebchuk et al. 
(2009): S&P 500 
Entrenchment Index Tobin’s Q, monthly 
abnormal return. 
-VE relationship to index and 
Tobin’s Q. -VE relationship to 
index with monthly abnormal 
return 
Wai (2013): Hong 
Kong and Singapore 
REITs 
Integrated CGSF 
(ICGSF) 
ROA, ROE, Sharp Ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, Dividend Yield, 
Debt/Equity 
Index, dividend yield show +VE 
relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
Debt/Equity no significant 
impact on Tobin’s Q 
 
Bauer et al. (2010) explain this as the REITs effect. However, Daines et al. (2009) on 
ratings of corporate governance shows that these may be used to change firm practices 
increasing rating but does not predict future shareholder litigation, operating 
performance, stock returns and cost of external finance. The failure to anticipate 
outcomes can be linked to measurement errors, as commercial rating does not 
occasionally correct for the endogeneity of variables. This gives some merit to an 
academically provided rating of the quality of corporate governance and a more 
reliable and valid academic measure that goes beyond the check-and-sum approach 
which fails to highlight provisions that can be substitutes or complements. REITs 
regimes in the UK, SA, and Nigeria should note the unique elements of its structure 
such as; distribution requirement, ownership structure, listing requirement, and asset 
activities restrictions that influence corporate governance and investment decision-
making.  
REITS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESEARCH IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, SOUTH AFRICA, AND NIGERIA 
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From the review of the literature, corporate governance and firm performance 
researchers on REITs in UK, SA and Nigeria are limited. However, some studies 
evaluating these themes in the UK, SA and Nigeria are discussed here. Brenni (2014) 
on corporate governance and capital structure decisions of UK listed real estate 
companies, measures the quality of corporate governance and leverage. He finds 
evidence that listed companies with larger board sizes, and greater CEO remunerations 
use less leverage, a negative relationship between the number of outside directors and 
the level of leverage used. Finally, there is an indication of the UK REITs being highly 
geared contrary to expectations of lower debt levels. 
Newell & Marzuki (2016) studied the performance of the UK REITs pre-and post-
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Their results highlight the significant position REITs 
plays in the UK real estate sector. They identified that pre-GFC the UK REITs 
significantly underperformed overall stock market with high-risk levels associated 
with investment in the property sector. Post-GFC results show the REITs regime 
appreciated speedily exceeding stocks and property companies. More recently, 
Jadevicius & Lee (2017) examined returns on different days of the week using the five 
largest UK REITs and non-REITs. Data were obtained during the pre-and-post-2007 
period of REIT regulation introduction. Using Kruskal-Wallis test and dummies to 
control for outliers, the results show that UK REIT returns were significant during the 
middle of the week and negative on Monday. It suggests that there exists an 
inefficiency in the UK REITs market and investors should buy on Monday and sell on 
Tuesday or Friday all things being equal.  
Ugwoke et al. (2013) used board proxies to measure the corporate governance and 
performance of listed companies in Nigeria REITs included; administering 
questionnaire to three top-ranking managers/accountants in 72 companies and finds 
that there is significant positive relationship between the board size, composition, 
frequency of meetings, regularity of members’ attendance and performance. Identified 
is the need for more experienced non-executive board members to check CEO 
excesses and reduce CEO duality. Olanrele et al. (2015) carried out a comparison of 
dividend performance in Nigeria REITs benched against the Malaysia REITs. The risk 
adjustment return analysis, concludes that Nigerian REITs underperforms when 
compared to Malaysia REIT. Though some differences in the structures of the REIT 
regimes exist, improvement of the Nigeria REITs is achievable through increased 
market capitalization and transparency, reduction in the cost of finance, changes in 
management style and critically issues of corporate governance.  
SA REITs differs other listed real estate in areas of taxation, legislation and legal 
formation. Ntuli & Akinsomi's (2016) analysis of the SA REITs shows its 
attractiveness to local and international investors. With evidence of a positive 
correlation between REITs and other listed shares offering good diversification option. 
Using a portfolio mix of bonds, shares and REITs, they concluded that REITs acted as 
a return-enhancer to the other investment. Against listed real estate, REITs had a 
higher return and lower risk. They also show that listed real estate have a weaker 
correlation with other assets, making REITs a better performer in the portfolio pool. 
Similar to an earlier research by Ugwoke et al. (2013) of corporate governance in 
Nigeria,  Pamburai et al.(2015) examined 158 listed companies on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE), extracting corporate governance proxies (board size, non-
executive directors, independent non-executive directors and number of meetings) 
manually from annual reports. Control variables (company size and leverage) are used 
to control for firm size, capital structure and risk, measured against performance 
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(Tobin’s Q, ROA, EVA). Results from the regression analysis show that board size is 
negatively related to EVA meaning smaller boards perform better than larger boards. 
Tobin’s Q is higher with more non-executive directors due to more monitoring. The 
frequent board meeting was, however, negative to ROA and Tobin’s Q. Finally, firm 
size showed a positive relationship with EVA and ROA.  
Emerging REITs exhibit issues such as limited market capitalization and transparency, 
property rights, regional politics protection, etc. which prevents more geographical 
diversification. Issues such as corruption, politics, and ownership structure of listed 
firm also affect the overall corporate governance in these regimes. With the onset of 
an institutional investor in the sector happening more in SA than in Nigeria, corporate 
governance and transparency of REITs will become of greater importance with 
possible enforcement better in SA (Afolabi 2015). Tsamenyi et al. (2007) express this 
as emerging market such as Nigeria and SA having high economic uncertainty, 
lacking in a legal institution for investor protection, weak stock market and economic 
performance and frequent government intervention which necessities the need for the 
demand of effective corporate governance structures to encourage investors. Ernst & 
Young (2016) report on the global perspective of REITs in emerging markets 
identified several young REITs markets (SA, Mexico, and Spain) to observe. They 
suggest improvement on issues such as risk, real estate transparency, ease of doing 
business, corporate governance, and market capitalization. It is arguably the case that 
the Nigerian REITs market has a lot to benefit from these suggestions. The popularity 
of REITs has grown in SA given as several UK REITs are now cross-listed on the JSE 
while the Nigerian REITs is yet to reach that level. Research using the corporate 
governance of UK REIT will help to identify key corporate governance variables 
unique to emerging REITs in SA and Nigeria that need improvement.  
INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING IN REITs  
It is assumed that firms with strong corporate governance framework will have 
managers make investment decisions that align with shareholder’s motives, leading to 
better firm performance. In the US, Eichholtz & Yönder's (2015) study of 
overconfidence in CEOs of REITs shows the need for a better understanding of the 
investment decision-making process. By observing corporate investment activities of 
US REITs CEOs regarding their stock portfolio, which is made possible by the full 
disclosure policy required to operate as a REIT. They observed that overconfident 
REIT CEOs in the US carry out more investment when they have access to 
discretionary cash. It is expressed by 1% increase in cash to asset ratio leads to 3-4% 
investment activity. In areas of acquisition activity and disposition, they found that the 
former increases by 0.8%-1.8% while the later decreases by 0.2%. Other results of the 
study using operating performance show that CEOs may have valuable information 
and use this to make an investment decision to their advantage showing poor corporate 
governance practices. They concluded that agency problems are higher in firms 
managed by overconfident CEOs. 
Parker (2014) helps in the further understanding of investment decision-making taken 
in REITs. From his research, the investment decision-making process used by 
Australia REITs was identified. Drawing from the literature on property investment 
decision-making and REITs investment decision-making is used to identify the 
normative mode (comprising of four stages with 20 steps), then a survey of present 
investment decision makers in the Australian REITs to develop a descriptive model. 
These models of investment decision-making by REITs managers are used to develop 
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a proposed prescriptive model to contribute to the transparency and consistency 
investment decision-making. Applying a similar approach, it is possible to investigate 
these models in the developed REITs of the UK, and emerging REITs of Nigeria and 
SA. From a review of literature, it is possible to identify the models of investment 
decision-making that applies to REITs and develop a prescriptive model that improves 
the investment decision-making in REITs.  
CONCLUSIONS 
From the literature review, the key elements in REITs corporate governance and 
investment decision-making research are derived from its structure which are; 
distribution requirement, ownership structure, listing requirement, and asset activities 
restrictions. While corporate governance proxies such as board structure, remuneration 
matters, audit, organization matters, related party transactions, ownership and gearing 
have been used individually or within an index or scoring framework to measure the 
quality of corporate governance against performance. However, it has been identified 
that some of these regulations are circumvented still bringing out corporate 
governance issues. 
In measuring the quality of corporate governance using internal and external proxies, 
institutions and academics have applied several approaches. When using any, it is 
crucial to understand the underlying methodology. Mixed results are observed from 
the various studies examined using some index or framework to measure the quality of 
corporate governance and performance of REITs, showing that corporate governance 
of highly regulated jurisdictions may have limited effect on the performance of REITs 
but becomes more crucial for emerging REIT regimes. The critical factors identified 
for the corporate governance and investment decision-making of REITs include 
market maturity, capitalization and transparency, management style and board issues. 
At a firm level, better corporate governance practice is expected to reflect on 
investment decision making by REITs, leading to an improvement in firm/shareholder 
value and reduced cost of capital. The behavioural pattern of governance is most 
suitable for research investigating corporate governance of REITs. Lastly, there exists 
ambiguity in the definition and scoping of the investment decision-making process of 
REITs. It is possible to identify normative, descriptive from the interview and propose 
a prescriptive model for investment decision-making for REITs. Contributing towards 
consistency and transparency in decision-making, leading to better decisions and 
optimal allocation of discretionary cash flow to ensure shareholder benefits are 
optimized. The findings will contribute to the development of a corporate governance 
scoring framework based on an analysis of the UK, SA, and Nigeria. 
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